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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Claimant was terminated from employment when his father purchased store merchandise 
using his employee discount, as was customary. This case involves whether the Industrial 
Commission (Commission) clearly erred as a matter of law by failing to make required factual 
findings, and, by the Commission's Decision that Claimant committed misconduct by failing to 
obey "Employer's expectations". See Decision, (Agency Record p.14, hereinafter "Record"). 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On August 18, 2014, the Appeals Examiner held a telephonic hearing from which he 
allowed Claimant benefits. (Record p.1). Respondents appealed. (Id. p.8). On December 22, 2014, 
the Commission reversed the Examiner's Decision and held that Claimant was discharged for 
misconduct under LC.§ 72-1366(5). (Id. p.14). Claimant appeals that reversal. (Id. pp.23-25). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claimant worked for Employer for ten years without incident (Transcript of Hearing p.12 
L.18)(hereinafter "RT"). The Employer testified he discharged Claimant because Claimant's 
father used his employee discount while Claimant was "on the clock". (RT p.9 L.23; p.10 L.11). 
The "Employer does not take issue with whether the merchandise that was purchased qualified 
under its policy." (Record, p.20, Decision and Order, p. 7). 
Claimant testified it was customary for family members to make discount purchases, and 
that employees make purchases while at work such as sodas, food, gloves, tape measures and 
work-related items. (RT p.13 L.11+; p.16 L.15+). The Appeals Examiner held Claimant's 
testimony was undisputed fact, i.e., that employees "are allowed to purchase items while on the 
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clock". (Record p.2, Appeals Examiner's "Findings of Fact" at No.8). This fact went 
unchallenged by the Employer. 
The Employer never alleged specific misconduct, i.e., (1) willful violation, (2) deliberate 
violation or (3) disregard for Employer's behavioral expectations. Instead they argued: "our 
handbook clearly states 'only the employee can make the purchase' and 'all purchases must be 
made on your own time . . . . What is the point in having policies if employees are not held 
accountable for misconduct?'". (Record p.8) Consequently, the Commission chose to disregard 
the first two benchmarks governing misconduct to focus on the third. Infra. 
The Commission determined that Claimant was discharged for the portions of the policy 
that require purchases be made by the employee and on the employee's time. (Record, p.20, 
Decision and Order, p.7). This, the Commission reasoned, constitutes misconduct pursuant to 
IDAPA 09.275.02(c)(i), for conduct falling "below the standard of behavior Employer expected''. 
(Id. at p.21, Order at 8). 
II. 
ISSUES 
A. The Employer's Discount Policy is Vague and Overbroad. 
B. The Employer's Discount Policy is NOT Uniformly Enforced. 
C. The Commission failed to apply both prongs of the "standard of behavior" analysis. 
D. The Commission disregarded State law. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Employers carry the burden of proving the employee was discharged for employment-
related misconduct. IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01. The determination of whether an employee's 
conduct constitutes misconduct is a question of fact. Marriott v. Shearer Lumber Products, 127 
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Idaho 620, 622, 903 P.2d 1317, 1319 (1998); Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408,412, 
247 P.3d 635, 639 (2011). Misconduct has been defined by this Court as (1) a willful, intentional 
disregard of the employer's interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or (3) a 
disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. 
Laundry v. Franciscan Health Care Center, 125 Idaho 279,282, 869 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1994). 
The Commission disregarded the first two forms of misconduct to settle on the subjective 
"standard-of-behavior test". The standard-of-behavior test for employee misconduct is a two-part 
inquiry encompassing ( 1) whether the employee's conduct fell below the standard of behavior 
expected by the employer; and (2) whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable 
in the particular case. Taylor v. Burley Care Center, 121 ldaho792, 793, 828 P.2d 821,822; In 
Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094--95, 695 P.2d 1231, 1234--35 (1984). 
In Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094--95, 695 P.2d 1231, 1234-35 
(1984 ), this Court held that some expectations and duties "flow normally from an employment 
relationship." Other expectations however, do not "flow naturally." If certain practices or 
expectations are not common among employees in general or within a particular enterprise, and 
have not been communicated by the employer to the employee, they cannot serve as a proper 
basis for a charge of employee misconduct. (Id.) 
On appeal, this Court reviews whether the Industrial Commission's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Eckhart v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 133 
Idaho 260, 262, 985 P.2d 685, 687 (1999). Substantial and competent evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. In re Wilson, 128 Idaho 
161, 164,911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). 
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However, "This Court may set aside the Commission's order when the findings of fact do 
not as a matter of law support the order. We exercise free review over the Commission's legal 
conclusions." McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 585, 272 P.3d 554, 557 (2012). "We 
only disturb factual findings if those findings are clearly erroneous, meaning they are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." Henderson v. Eclipse Traffic Control & 
Flagging, Inc., 147 Idaho 628,631,213 P.3d 718,721 (2009). 
"When erroneous evidence is considered in arriving at a factual decision, particularly 
where the ultimate factual issue is close, the case should be remanded to the fact finder to 
reconsider the factual issue without the erroneous evidence." Kiele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 
127 Idaho 681,685, 905 P.2d 82, 86 (1995). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. EMPLOYER POLICY IS AMBIGUOUS AND INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED 
1. First, "Purchases made during the day must be paid for and kept in the office until you 
leave the store." This directive conflicts with the requirement that "The merchandise should be 
removed from the store once the sale transaction is complete." (Record p.9, Discount Policy). 
These policy mandates are inconsistent and ambiguous. 
2. Second, both parties testified employees purchase merchandise for myriad reasons "while 
on the clock". (RT p. 13 L.11; p.16 L.15; p.17 L.13; p.18 L.4). Conversely, the Employer then 
contradicts himself by arguing that employees can only make discount purchases when they are 
"off the clock". (RT p.17 LL.19-20). The Appeals Examiner rejected the Employer's off the clock 
argument and held in fact that employees "are allowed to purchase items while on the clock". 
(Record p.2, Examiner's "Findings of Fact" at No.8). The Employer's erratic and confusing 
application of the discount policy shows the ambiguous and vacillating nature of the policy. 
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3. Third, the testimony that purchases are made "while on the clock" contradicts the directive 
that "Purchases may only be made on the employee's off-duty time". "Off duty" is defined as: 
"of, pertaining to, or during a period when a person is not at work." See, Webster's New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary, p.1344. Thus, employees are never truly "off duty" until they 
leave the workplace, making "off duty" purchases ambiguous since purchases are undeniably 
made "during the day". (RT p. 13 L.11; p.16 L.15; p.17 L.13; p.18 L.4). 
4. Fourth, the Employer's reasoning for firing Claimant was that he violated policy by not 
making the purchase. (RT. plO L.6-9; p.11 LL. 7-8). On the other hand, the inclusion of family 
members into the employee policy creates conflict in policy interpretation. For example, if 
Claimant goes on vacation how does a family member receive the product discount? It stretches 
the limits of logic to suggest Claimant must return home to make the purchase or all parties 
forfeit the sale. The policy infers that family members are allowed to make discounted purchases 
beneficial to the company and the family member. It is more reasonable that Claimant 
inadvertently violated the confusing policy. This is not misconduct. See, IDAPA 09.275.03 
5. Fifth, the Commission's Decision reasoned that Claimant committed misconduct for 
conduct falling "below the standard of behavior Employer expected". See, (Record p.21, 
Decision and Order p.8). The two-prong test for misconduct in "standard of behavior cases" is: 
(i) Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the employer; 
and (ii). Whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in the particular case. 
See, IDAPA 09.275.02(c)(i)(ii). The Commission failed to evaluate whether Claimant's conduct 
was objectively reasonable. This is plain error. 
6. Sixth, "To meet the standard-of-behavior test and prove discharge for misconduct, an 
employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been communicated to 
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the employee." Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 4, 105 P.3d 267, 271 (2004). If 
certain practices or expectations are not common among employees in general or within a 
particular enterprise, and have not been communicated by the employer to the employee, they 
cannot serve as a proper basis for a charge of employee misconduct. Davis v. Howard 0. Miller 
Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094-95, 695 P.2d 1231, 1234-35 (1984). 
Here, Claimant received notice of the policy but the Employer never communicated their 
expectation as to how that policy was to be interpreted. (RT p.11 LL.9-14). Claimant was then 
told that employees must follow all policies or face dismissal. (RT p.15 LL.1-5). 
Pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act: 
"mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure of good performance as the result of 
inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, isolated instances of ordinary negligence, or good 
faith errors in judgment or discretion are not considered misconduct connected with 
employment. IDAPA 09.275.03 (emphasis added). 
"The rule by its clear terms refers to an employee's unintended substandard performance of his or 
her duties." Stark v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 152 Idaho at 510, 272 P.3d at 482 (2012). The 
record is clear that Claimant's behavior was, at most, no more than a negligent good faith effort to 
interpret and comply with the vague discount policy. See, (RT p.13 L.17; p.15 LL.4-5). 
B. EMPLOYER'S POLICY IS NOT FOLLOWED REGULARLY 
The Parties swore that employees purchase merchandise while they are on the clock 
earning wages. (RT p.16 L.15; p.17 LL.13-19 p.18 LL.4-22). The Examiner agreed. (Record p.2, 
"Findings of Fact" at No.8). 
Moreover, the testimony established that for ten ( 10) years Claimant and other employees 
have engaged in purchasing practices the Employer now argues is misconduct. (RT p.13 L.11; 
p.16 L.15; p.17 L.13; p.18 L.4). The other employees referred to were listed in Claimant's 
Protest/Appeal Letter. (Record, p.23). One referred-to employee was Kathy Whitehead. [NOTE: 
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Claimant could not obtain Ms. Whitehead's statement prior to the Examiner's hearing but faxed it 
to the Commission on February 10, 2014, shortly after its Decision. See attached, (Appendix at 
p.14, Statement of Kathy Whitehead). In the interests of justice Claimant respectfully requests Ms. 
Whitehead's statement be appended to the Agency Record. 
The Commission's Decision centers on whether Claimant could establish that the policy 
was not consistently enforced: 
"Claimant asserts Employer's policy was not the common practice." (Record, p.19; 
Decision and Order, p.6). Unfortunately, Claimant's mere assertion alone is insufficient to 
establish a contrary course of conduct. (Record, p.20; Decision and Order, p.7); 
Unfortunately, Claimant did not provide sufficient evidence to support his contention and 
failed to show there was a contrary course of conduct to the Employer's policy. (Record, 
p.21; Decision and Order, p.8). 
This Court has repeatedly held that: 
"Appellate court review is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were 
presented ... below."' Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 
443,444 (2006) (quoting State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465,468, 872 P.2d 728, 731 (Ct. App. 
1994)). 
Claimant presented his argument by sworn testimony and argued the policy was not 
enforced. (RT p.13 L.11; p.16 L.15; p.17 L.13; p.18 L.4); (Record, p.19 <J[3; Decision and Order, 
p.6 <J[3). "An employer's expectation ... is not reasonable if it is contrary to an established course 
of conduct." Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 412, 247 P.3d 635, 638 (2011). The 
burden is on the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the policy was 
routinely foHowed. E.g., Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640. Significantly, the Employer 
did not dispute Claimant's argument on this material fact. 
The Commission abused its discretion by flouting the Examiner's Findings of Fact No.8 by 
holding that Claimant's uncontested sworn testimony was a "mere assertion ... insufficient to 
establish a contrary course of conduct". (Record, p.20; Decision, p.7). 
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C. THE COMMISSION DISREGARDED STATE LAW 
On appeal, this Court reviews whether the Industrial Commission's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Eckhart v. Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 133 
Idaho 260, 262, 985 P.2d 685, 687 (1999). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Uhl v. Ballard Med. 
Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). The Court "must set aside the order 
of the Commission where it failed to make a proper application of law to the evidence." Bortz v. 
Payless Drug Store, 110 Idaho 942,945, 719 P.2d 1202, 1205 (1986). 
Claimant's testimony revealed the policy was not applied evenly and refers to employees 
using the policy as did Claimant. (RT p.14 L.20; p.16 L.15; p.17 L.13; p.18 L.4). His was the 
only testimony offered to demonstrate routine practice. (Id.) The Employer did not dispute that 
this was their practice. The Examiner held Claimant's testimony was fact. (Record p.2, "Findings 
of Fact" No.8). Thus, Claimant's undisputed sworn testimony is relevant and material evidence 
establishing the Employer's routine practice. 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 401. 
Evidence of a habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether 
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove 
that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with the habit or routine practice. l.R.E. Rule 406 (emphasis added). 
Statutory provisions and rules governing the admissibility of evidence, to the extent they 
are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect. l.R.E. Rule 1102. 
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The Commission abused its discretion by failing to acknowledge Claimant's undisputed 
testimony as evidence going to the foundation of the case which reasonable minds might accept to 
support Claimant's argument that the policy was not strictly enforced. In re Wilson, 128 Idaho 
161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). Moreover, it clearly contravened the letter and spirit of 
I.RE. Rule 406 by holding that Claimant was required to submit corroboration. 
An analogous argument for what constitutes substantive evidence arises in the context of 
summary judgments. Courts may properly grant a summary judgment motion where there are no 
genuine issues of material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(e); Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 
128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996); Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 
P .2d 1272, 127 5 ( 1991). According! y, the Commission abused its discretion by its erroneous 
interpretation of what constitutes substantive evidence. 
D. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO CONDUCT FULL MISCONDUCT ANALYSIS 
1. Commission erred by concluding the Employer's conduct expectations were 
reasonable AND sufficiently communicated 
Misconduct benchmarks are defined as ( 1) a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's 
interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or (3) a disregard of standards of 
behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Laundry v. Franciscan 
Health Care Center, 125 Idaho 279, 282, 869 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1994). The Commission focused 
solely on the third criterion, the two-prong "standard of behavior test". (Record p.17). 
The standard of behavior test requires a two-part inquiry encompassing (1) whether the 
employee's conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) 
whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in the particular case. IDAPA 
09.275.02(c)(i)(ii). Taylor v. Burley Care Center, 121 Idaho792, 793, 828 P.2d 821,822; In Davis 
v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094-95, 695 P.2d 1231, 1234-35 (1984). 
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The Commission ruled Claimant committed misconduct for conduct falling "below the 
standard of behavior Employer expected". (Record p.21, Decision and Order p.8). 
As argued above in Sec. N(A)(5), if certain practices or expectations are not common 
among employees in general or within a particular enterprise, and have not been communicated 
by the employer to the employee, they cannot serve as a proper basis for a charge of employee 
misconduct. Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094-95, 695 P.2d 1231, 1234-35 
(1984). Employer has no right to expect compliance with an uncommunicated standard. Welch v. 
Cowles Pub. Co., 900 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1995). Here, normal behavior was for employees "to 
purchase items while on the clock". (Record p.2, Examiner's "Findings of Fact" at No.8). 
The Employer never relayed its' expectations on how the policy should be interpreted and 
applied. Instead, it only provides a general warning that any policy violation would result in 
discharge. Thus, the Commission erred by holding the Employer communicated proper 
expectations regarding the discount policy. 
2. The Commission failed to determine whether Claimant's behavior was 
objectively reasonable as required by IDAPA 09.275.02(c)(ii) 
The Commission addressed the first prong of the standard of behavior test and ignored the 
second-prong inquiry as to whether Claimant's actions were objectively reasonable, as required 
by IDAPA 09.275.02(c)(ii). Without making this finding, the Commission simply assumes 
Claimant's behavior was unreasonable because he failed to produce additional evidence showing 
the policy was not routinely followed. However, once Claimant provided uncontested evidence on 
the routine policy practice the burden shifted to the Employer to dispute such. It chose not to. 
Thus, the Commission's failure to conduct a second-prong analysis of the standard of 
behavior test is plain error and REMAND is required. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
Claimant's father visited the hardware store to buy merchandise. Claimant walked over to 
give his ID code. Claimant did not make the purchase because for ten (10) years this process was 
the norm for employees and their family members. The Employer did not dispute this fact. Thus, 
the Claimant did not commit misconduct. 
WHEREFORE, Claimant prays this Honorable Court will REVERSE, UPHOLD the 
Decision of the Appeals Examiner, and allow Appellant costs. 
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